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Abstract 
 
This study demarcates cost- inefficiency in Chinese banks into X-inefficiency and 
rent-seeking- inefficiency. A protected banking market not only encourages weak 
management and X-inefficiency but also public ownership and state directed lending 
encourages moral hazard and bureaucratic rent seeking. This paper uses bootstrap 
non-parametric techniques to estimate measures of X-inefficiency and rent-seeking 
inefficiency for the 4 state owned banks and 11 joint-stock banks over the period 
1997-2004. In contrast to other studies of the Chinese banking sector, the paper 
argues that reduced inefficiency is an indicator that the competitive threat of the 
opening up of the banking market in 2007 has produced tangible bene fits in improved 
performance. This paper finds evidence of declining trend in both types of 
inefficiency.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
As China prepares for full integration into WTO in 2007, the Chinese banking 
system is poised to break free from the residual vestige of state control with a series of 
recent and planned IPO listings of the major state banks and increased stake holdings 
by foreign banks of the smaller commercial banks. The strategy of allowing a larger 
stake holding in the Chinese banking system by foreign banks as a means of 
improving efficiency has a good academic pedigree. The link between privatization 
and efficiency improvement in former government owned enterprises is now very 
much an established finding (Megginson and Netter, 2001). The link between 
privatization of banking and efficiency improvement is an emerging research area 
(see Megginson, 2005 for a survey).  
Given the impending listing of the major state owned banks and the tacit 
acceptance of larger stakes by foreign banks in the smaller commercial banks, it is not 
surprising that bank efficiency in China has become a popular subject of research in 
recent years. A number of studies of Chinese banking efficiency have been published 
in Chinese scholarly journals 1 but to date there have been only a few studies that are 
available to non-Chinese readers2.   
The Chinese banking system remains relatively protected until 2007. While 
the gradualist economic reform policies of Deng Xiaoping have transformed 
management practice and corporate efficiency in the manufacturing sector, it can be 
argued that the mindset of the corporatist thinking in management continues in much 
of the state owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, including its banks.  
                                                 
1 For example Qing and Ou, (2001); Xu, Junmin, and Zhensheng, (2001); Wei and Wang, (2000); Xue and Yang, (1998) and 
Zhao (2000) have used non-parametric methods while  
2 A recent exception is a study using non-parametric methods by Chen et. al. (2005) and parametric methods by Fu and 
Heffernan (2005) 
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Inefficiency relative to 'best practice' is usually blamed on bad management 
and poor motivation. Following Leibenstein (1966) this efficiency gap is termed 'X-
inefficiency'. In the context of an economy that has only recently begun to open its 
banking sector, this paper argues that a significant cause of bank inefficiency is ‘rent 
seeking’ behavior, rather than X-inefficiency. 
 This research has two objectives. First it aims to decompose the measure of 
efficiency in Chinese banks into Technical Efficiency (TE), and Cost Efficiency (CE). 
Proponents of the X-efficiency (XE) view argue that TE is consistent with XE. 
However, with reference to the minimum cost point of operation, overall efficiency 
must be measured in terms of cost efficiency. This paper argues that while the 
underutilization of factors is consistent with the notion of X-inefficiency, the wrong 
factor-mix is indicative of 'rent-seeking'. The decomposition of cost inefficiency into 
X-inefficiency (technical inefficiency) and rent-seeking inefficiency allows us to 
examine their evolution over the sample period.     
Second, this paper aims to provide an inferential capability to the point-
estimates of efficiency through the use of bootstrapping methods. The question this 
part of the analysis poses is, are the measures of relative efficiency significantly 
different from the benchmark? Are the measures of X-inefficiency and 'rent-seeking' 
statistically significant? The threat of entry of foreign banks into the Chinese market 
should lead to improved management, which will result in improved technical 
efficiency and lower cost- inefficiency as incumbent banks attempt to cut costs and 
consolidate their balance sheets.   
This paper is organized on the following lines. The next section outlines the 
background to the Chinese banking system. Section 3 discusses the literature and 
outlines the non-parametric method of estimating bank efficiency. Section 4 discusses 
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the concept of X-inefficiency and the implications for its measurement in the context 
of banking. Section 5 discusses the data and methodology of bootstrapping as applied 
to the non-parametric method. Section 6 discusses the results and section 7 concludes.  
 
2. Chinese Banking 
 The metamorphosis of the Chinese banking system from the monolithic 
system based around a single bank that was the instrument of socialist planning, to 
something resembling a modern banking system, occurred in 19793. Prior to 1979, the 
role of the banks was to provide credit to state-owned enterprises. In 1979 the 
monopolistic position of the Peoples Bank of China (PBOC) was removed with the 
establishment of three specialized banks in the early 1980s that took over its banking 
business. The Agricultural Bank of China (ABOC) took over the business of 
providing credits to the rural sector, The Bank of China (BOC) took over foreign 
currency transactions, and the China Construction Bank (CCB) took over financing 
the construction sector. A fourth specialized bank, the Industrial and Commercial 
Bank of China was set up in 1984 that eventually took over the commercial business 
of the PBOC in 1994. The 1980s saw the setting up of other commercial banks, joint-
stock banks, and state-owned investment banks. The Commercial Bank Law of 1995 
ushered in a two-tier banking system. At the apex sits the PBOC and below it the 
commercial banks that is subject to prudential regulations and supervision by the 
PBOC. Policy banks were officially separated from commercial banks, although in 
reality because of a lack of a branch network, the commercial banks continued with 
policy lending (Chen et. al 2005). From 1996 onwards, foreign banks were allowed to 
                                                 
3 An extensive review of the Chinese banking system can be found in Shirai (2002), and Allen, Qian and Qian (2005a) (2005b)  
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open branches across China but their business was still confined to the non-RMB 
market. Limited interest rate deregulation followed. 
 In 2005, the Chinese banking system consisted of some 30,000 institutions, 
including 3 policy banks, 4 state-owned commercial banks, 13l joint-stock 
commercial banks, 115 city commercial banks, 238 operational entities of foreign 
banks and the rest made up of urban and rural credit cooperatives and other financial 
institutions. 
 Like many economies that have undeveloped financial and capital markets, the 
banking sector in China plays a pivotal role in financial intermediation. Table 1 below 
shows that the ratio of total bank deposits to GDP has increased from 99.1%, in 1997, 
to 180.5% in 2004. The market is absolutely dominated by the four state owned 
banks, although their share of the market has been decreasing steadily through gains 
made by the Joint-stock banks. 
 
Table 1: The Chinese banking Market 
Variable 1997 2002 2004 
Total Deposits to 
GDP 
99.1% 149.9%a 190.5%a 
SOB Employment 
 
1,394.8 thousand 1,467.8 thousand 
 
1,409 thousande 
SOB Market share 
% assets 
- 71.4% 54.1% 
ROAA SOB* 0.24% 0.19% 0.55% 
Cost-Income Ratio 
SOB* 
93.3%c 61.9% 45.4% 
Sources: IMF International Financial Statistics, Annual Accounts, The Banker, China 
Regulatory Banking Corporation website, Almanac of China’s Finance and Banking, 
a) Including foreign currency deposits, e) estimated, * weighted average by asset 
share, c) two state owned banks only 
 
Faced with the potential of increased competition from the end of 2006 onwards, the 
big banks have begun the process of restructuring and reducing unit costs. 
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Employment in the state-owned banks has declined from a peak number of 1,468 
thousand in 2002, return on average assets have shown some improvement (partly as a 
result of the removal of a proportion of NPLs from the balance sheet and its 
transference to asset management companies and partly through a greater flexibility in 
setting loan rate margins). Significantly, the major banks have worked to reduce costs 
as shown in the sharp reduction in the weighted average cost-income ratio. 
   Up until 1995, control of the banking system remained firmly under 
the government and its agencies4. Under state control, the banks in China served the 
socialist plan of directing credits to specific projects dictated by political preference 
rather than commercial imperative. Since 2001 foreign banks and financial 
institutions were allowed to take a stake in selected Chinese banks. While control of 
individual Chinese banks remain out of reach for the foreign institution5, the pressure 
to reform management, consolidate balance sheets, improve risk management and 
reduce unit costs has increased with greater foreign exposure. Table 2 shows the 
extent of foreign ownership of individual banks.  
 The theory of market contestability (Baumol, 1982) suggests that incumbent 
banks will restructure weak balance sheets, reduce costs, and improve efficiency in 
preparation for the threat of entry. Chinese banks should exhibit less inefficiency, 
whichever way measured, in 2004 than in 1997. 
                                                 
4 According to La Porta, et. al (2002), 99% of the 10 largest commercial banks were owned and under the control of the 
government in 1995. 
5 There is a cap of 25% on total equity held by foreigners and a maximum of 20% for any single investor, except in the case of 
joint-venture banks 
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Table 2: Foreign Bank Ownership Stake 
Chinese Bank Foreign Bank - Stake % Announcement Date 
Bank of Shanghai HSBC - 8% December 2001 
Shanghai Pudong Bank Citigroup - 4.6% December 2003 
Fujian Asia Bank HSBC - 50% December 2003 
Industrial Bank Hang Seng - 16% April 2004 
Bank of Communications HSBC - 19.9% June 2004 
Xian City Comm. Bank Scotia Bank - 12.4% October 2004 
Jinan City Comm. Bank C Bank of Australia - 11% November 2004 
Shenzen Develop. Bank  Newbridge Cap - 17.9% December 2004 
Minsheng Bank Temasek - 4.6% January 2005 
Hangzhou City Com Bank C Bank of Australia - 19.9%  
China Construction Bank Bank of America - 9% 
Temasek - 5.1% 
June 2005 
Bank of China RBS - 5%, UBS - 1.6%. 
Temasek - 10% 
August 2005 
ICBC Goldman Sachs, Allianz, 
American Express - 10% 
August 2005 
Nanjing City Com. Bank BNP Paribas - 19.2% October 2005 
Hua Xia Bank Deutsche bank - 9.9% 
Sal Oppenheim Jr. - 4.1% 
October 2005 
   Source: Business Week October 31, 2005 
 
 
3. Methodology and Literature Review 
Most studies of banking efficiency have focussed on the developed 
economies6. While there have been some studies of other Far Eastern economies7, the 
number is small in comparison. Indeed, of Berger and Humphrey's (1997) survey of 
130 studies of frontier analysis in 21 countries, only 8 were about developing and 
Asian countries (including 2 in Japan). Studies on US financial institutions were the 
most common, accounting for 66 out of 116 single country studies. 
                                                 
6 Drake and Hall (2003), Cavallo and Rossi (2002), Elyasiani and Rezvanian (2002), Maudos et al. (2002), Drake (2001) 
Altunbas and Molyneux (1996) and Molyneux and Forbes (1993) 
7See Rezvanian and Mehdian (2002), Hardy and di Patti (2001), Karim (2001), Laevan (1999), Katib and Matthews  (1999), Chu 
and Lim (1998), Bhattacharyya et al. (1997) and Fukuyama (1995) 
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The basis of the non-parametric method of Data Envelope Analysis (DEA) is 
the extension by Charnes et al. (1978)  (CCR)8 of the single input-output model of 
Farrell (1957) to a multiple input-output generalisation. Technical efficiency (TE) is 
measured as the ratio of projected output (on the efficient frontier) to actual input 
used. There are a number of papers that describe the methodology of DEA as applied 
to banking9, what follows is a brief description. 
Let us say that there are N banks. Let zi represent the input matrix of the ith 
bank, and yi represent its output matrix. Let the KxN input matrix be denoted Z and 
the MxN output matrix be denoted Y. The efficiency measure of each of the N banks is 
maximised by the DEA searching for the ratio of all weighted outputs over all 
weighted inputs, where the weights are selected from the dual of the linear 
programming problem specified as: 
qlq ,min  
subject to   
0
0
0
³
³-
³+-
l
lq
l
Zz
Yy
i
i
   (1) 
where l is a Nx1 vector of constants q is a scalar and is the economic efficiency score 
of the ith bank (0 < q  < 1). 
The estimation of cost efficiency involves the comparison of minimum cost at 
the optimal factor ratios to actual cost at the observed factor ratios. The minimisation 
exercise becomes: 
   *,min iiz zi wl       
subject to   
0
0
* ³-
³+-
l
l
Zz
Yy
i
i
   (2)   
                                                 
8 Charnes et. al (1978) popularised the DEA method.Tavares (2002) produces a bibliography of DEA (1978-2001). There are 
3203 DEA authors whose studies cover a wide range of fields. Banxia.com also compiles DEA papers from 1978 to the present. 
9 The most recent being Drake (2004) 
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where iw  is a vector of input prices for the i
th bank and *iz is the cost minimising 
vector of inputs for the ith bank. A graphical illustration helps to differentiate the two 
concepts in the case of CRS.  
 Figure 1 shows an isoquant qq producing a given output with factor inputs x 
and n and isocost ww, which traces the ratio of factor prices. The efficient cost 
minimising position is shown at e where ww is tangential to qq. Employing a factor 
combination shown by point c, which is to the right of the isoquant qq indicates that 
the firm is technically inefficient. Efficiency is decomposed into technical efficiency 
and allocative efficiency (AE).  
 
Figure 1: Technical Efficiency and Allocative Efficiency  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Technical efficiency is measured by the ratio Oa/Oc. The cost to the firm is 
shown by w''w'' which is parallel to ww and passes through point c. Cost efficiency 
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(CE) is measured by Ob/Oc and Ob/Oa gives AE. It can be seen therefore from this 
decomposition that under CRS; 
   
TE
CE
AE =    (3) 
However, the CCR model under the assumption of CRS is only appropriate 
when all banks are at the optimal scale. This requires that the Decision Making Units 
(DMUs) operate on the flat portion of the long run average cost curve. However, scale 
inefficiency can be estimated by altering the CCR model to allow for variable returns 
to scale (VRS). Banker et. al (1984) (BCC) account for scale effects by estimating the 
most productive scale size for each DMU while identifying its technical efficiency10. 
Therefore technical efficiency is further decomposed into measures of pure technical 
efficiency (PTE) and scale efficiency (SE). Hauner (2005) demonstrates that under the 
assumption of VRS, cost efficiency (CE) can be further decomposed by the formula; 
   CE = AE.SE.TE  (4) 
DEA constructs a non-parametric frontier of the best practices amongst the 
decision-making units (DMUs). An efficiency score for each DMU is measured in 
relation to this frontier. An efficiency score is constructed under both CRS and VRS. 
If the efficiency score of each bank produced by these models differ significantly, 
then the banks are said to experience variable returns to scale (Avkiran, 1999). In the 
case of VRS, a model can be orientated either by using input minimisation (efficiency 
gain through input reduction) or output maximisation (efficiency gain from output 
expansion).   
                                                 
10 Coelli (1996) shows that the use of the CRS specification when some of the banks are not operating at the optimal scale will 
result in measures of technical efficiency that are mixed up with scale efficiency. 
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DEA is relatively insensitive to model specification (input or output 
orientation) and functional form11, however the results are sensitive to the choice of 
inputs and outputs. The weakness of the DEA approach is that it assumes data are free 
from measurement errors. Furthermore, since efficiency is measured in a relative way, 
its analysis is confined to the sample used. This means that an efficient DMU found in 
the analysis cannot be compared in a straightforward way with other DMUs outside of 
the sample.  
A small but growing industry of efficiency studies of Chinese banks has 
emerged in recent years, using both DEA and stochastic frontier analysis 12. The 
consensus of finding from the DEA studies is threefold. First, because of the 
continued banking reform programme technical inefficiency has been declining over 
time. Second, average bank efficiency is lower in the state owned banks (SOBs) than 
in the joint stock banks. Third, the gap between the two has been narrowing in recent 
years.  
 
4.0 Rent-seeking and X-inefficiency  
Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) argue that X-inefficiency constitutes 20% or more 
of bank costs. Proponents of the theory of X-efficiency suggest that the familiar 
average cost curve of a firm is a ‘thick band’ rather than a thin line. The band  defines 
a range of costs per given level of output, which will depend on the application of 
pressure and motivation on the personnel employed13. Poor motivation and weak 
pressure resulting in under utilization of factors of production, is part of what 
Leibenstein (1975) describes as ‘organisational entropy’. X-inefficiency arises as a 
                                                 
11 Hababou (2002) and Avkiran (1999) provide a relatively thorough discussion of the merits and limits of the DEA. 
12 In addition to the papers cited in footnote 1, other studies by Chinese scholars that have used non-parametric techniques 
include Xu, Junmin and Zhennsheng (2001), Zhang and Li (2001), Fang et. al. (2004). Studies using parametric methods include 
Zhang, Gu and Di (2005), Chen and Song (2004), Liu and Liu (2004), Sun (2005), Qian (2003), Chi, Sun and Lu (2005), Yao, 
Feng and Jiang (2004)  
13 See for example Franz (1988) 
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result of low pressure for performance. Some institutions would be protected by 
government regulation that would reduce the external pressure from competition. But 
even with a higher degree of pressure from the environment, firms may have 
organisational deficiencies so that management signals and incentives are lost in the 
hierarchy of the organisation.  
Studies of bank efficiency have used the terms technical efficiency and X-
efficiency interchangeably as if they were the same thing. While similar in concept 
they are not necessarily the same. The concept of technical efficiency derives its basis 
from the neo-classical theory of the firm and assumed profit maximising behaviour. A 
firm or a bank may be technically inefficient for technical reasons such as low 
training or human capital levels of managers and workers, or the use of inferior or 
out-of-date technology. The diffusion of new technology is not instantaneous and 
some firms or banks may lag behind others in the acquisition and utilisation of new 
technology. With further training and updating of capital, the firm or bank can expect 
to move towards the efficient frontier. X-inefficiency is not caused by the variability 
of skills or the time variability of technology diffusion but by the use and organisation 
of such skills and technology. 
Leibenstein and Maital (1992) suggest that X-inefficiency and its composition 
can be measured through the use of DEA analysis. The partitioning of the efficiency 
scores enables the differentiation between motivational factors and management 
deficiency. Leibenstein and Maital (1992) argue that the slack analysis of efficiency is 
a means of separating the proximate causes of X-inefficiency including management 
performance14.  
                                                 
14 Chen (2001) uses the decomposition to identify management X-inefficiency in Taiwan’s banks. 
  
13 
13 
The two main scalars produced by DEA analysis is theta (?), and iota (?). The 
former measures that portion of X-inefficiency that could be eliminated by the 
proportional reduction of inputs. However, even after reducing inputs, some inputs 
may still exhibit slack15 which is measured by the latter iota. Iota measures the total 
amount of X-inefficiency and therefore the direct management deficiency is measured 
by ? – ?. While this partitioning of the DEA score separates out the potential factors 
that contribute to the overall measure, there is no obvious economic reason as to why 
the decomposition identifies management deficiency explicitly.  
An alternative interpretation of non cost-minimising behaviour is ‘rent 
seeking’ in the sense of Buchanan (1980) and Tullock (1967, 1980).  Rent seeking in 
its basic form is the appropriation of surplus in the process of production or exchange 
without any real contribution to the process of either. Where there are government 
regulations on enterprise, barriers to entry and other anti-competitive rules, officials 
have the opportunity to extract rents through the mechanism of bribery and 
corruption. Therefore the term rent seeking has been generally associated with 
extortion, bribery and corruption. While it is generally accepted that corruption is 
fairly widespread in the financial sector in China, a number of high profile cases have 
made this subject a matter of contemporary concern16. The fall-out from a number of 
well-publicized cases could have the effect of reducing activity in this particular area.   
However, a hidden but much more pervasive type of rent seeking is the 
extraction of larger budgets for bureaucracies and what results in the non-pecuniary 
rewards to workers in government owned enterprises (Tullock, 1967 and McKenzie 
and Tullock 1981).  The prestige of the senior bureaucrats is enhanced if the size of 
                                                 
15 See Zhu (2003) pp. 39-45 
16 The former Governor of the Construction Bank of China Wang Xuebing was sentenced to 12 years jail for accepting bribes of 
1.15 million Yuan. The Vice-President of the Bank of China received a suspended death sentence for embezzling 14.5 million 
Yuan and accepting bribes of 1.4 million Yuan. See also Fan, Rui and Zhao (2006) 
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the workforce is expanded to be larger than necessary to meet production targets. 
Similarly, offices are more grandiose, holidays are longer, and benefits are greater and 
so on.  
One way of capturing the extent of bureaucratic rent seeking is to use the 
decomposition of bank efficiency into the components of cost inefficiency and 
technical efficiency. We can assume that the manager of a cost-minimising DMU 
facing a technology described by ),( nxfq e=  with costs described as wnrx + , where 
q is output, x and n are factor inputs, r and w are factor prices and e is managerial 
effort, )10( £< e , will maximise his utility at the optimum position for the firm. The 
marginality conditions are given by equation (5) below, which corresponds to ww in 
figure 1.  
   
w
r
f
f
n
x =     (5) 
A ray from the origin to the tangency point e on figure 1 defines the optimal factor 
mix. The demand for factor inputs is given by; 
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Managerial efficiency is 100% if e = 1. However, if e < 1, then the organisation will 
be to the right of the isoquant shown in figure 1. 
The utility function of a rent-seeking bureaucrat would include not just the 
output of the firm or organisation but also that of a particular factor of production 
(usually labour and complementary factors such as plush offices and top-grade 
computers etc.). The utility function of the bureaucrat can be represented 
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by ( ))(nVqUU += . The bureaucrat minimises costs subject to his preference 
function. Equation (7) is the Lagrangean. 
( )UnVnxfUwnrxL -+-+= ))(),((el   (7) 
From the first-order conditions 
    
w
r
Vf
f
nn
x =
+
    (5’) 
Equation (5’) shows a factor mix that favours factor n in comparison with the optimal 
factor mix and is represented by the ray from the origin 0a. If e < 1, then the 
organisation will display managerial inefficiency by being on a point off the isoquant 
but at point 0c. The factor mix implied by (5') is n > n* and x < x*.    
From figure 1, we can see that at point 'a' the DMU is technically efficient but 
is allocatively inefficient. A bank can organise its input factors to be on its production 
frontier but be using the wrong factor mix. Rent seeking in monopolistic public 
utilities involves over-staffing, 'elaborate offices and a lot of trips to important 
conferences' or 'expensive subsidised restaurants' (McKenzie and Tullock, 1981). The 
wrong factor mix in the case of the Chinese banking sector can be interpreted as 
excess staffing. The management of the banks may reduce technical efficiency (X-
inefficiency as it has been sometimes interpreted) by moving the cost frontier from 
w''w'' to w'w', but would still remain cost inefficient as shown by the gap ab/Oc. The 
gap between the minimum cost optimal factor mix and the technically efficient 
minimum cost associated with the efficient production frontier with the sub-optimal 
factor mix (or allocative inefficiency) can be interpreted as the inefficiency associated 
with 'rent seeking' 17.    
 
                                                 
17 Crain and Zardkoohi (1980) suggest that X-inefficiency and rent seeking co-exist and that changes to X-inefficiency are offset 
by equal changes in rent seeking, so that there is a trade-off between one type of inefficiency against another. 
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5.0 Data and Bootstrapping 
This study employs annual data (1997-2004) for 15 banks; the four state-owned 
banks, ten joint-stock commercial banks and one joint-venture bank. Data for one of 
the joint-stock banks was unavailable for 2004 (China Everbright) and in that year 14 
banks data was used. The total sample consisted of 119 bank year observations. The 
main source of the data was Fitch/Bankscope and the Almanac of China’s Finance 
and Banking (various). The choice of banks was based on the fact that they face a 
common market and compete nationwide. The one joint-venture bank in the sample is 
an example of a bank that has strong foreign intervention and would according to the 
consensus of evidence, be expected to exhibit a high level of efficiency, even though 
it can be argued that as a regional bank it would not necessarily be competing in the 
same markets as the other banks in the sample. A list of the banks used in the 
estimation is provided in the appendix.  
Two approaches are normally taken in determining what constitutes bank 
input and output. Under the intermediation approach, bank assets measure outputs and 
liabilities measure inputs.  In contrast, inputs in the production approach are physical 
entities such as labour and capital. Deposits are a measure of output. In this study, we 
consider three sets of outputs. First, we use three inputs and three outputs selected 
under the intermediation approach for the estimation of technical efficiency. Inputs 
are the number of employees (LAB), fixed assets (FA) and total deposits (DEP). 
Outputs are total loans (LOANS), other earning assets (OEA), and other operating 
income (NII). Although the latter variable remains undeveloped in China, it is selected 
to reflect the growing contribution of non- interest income to banks’ total income. 
Second, we consider the quality of the loan portfolio by stripping out non-performing 
loans (NPLs) from the stock loans for each bank (LOANSQ). In both cases, the vector 
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of inputs is the same as in the first case. The argument for adjusting loans for NPLs is 
to mitigate the effect of the large loan portfolios held by the big-4 SOBs on the 
efficiency calculation. The unadjusted loan portfolio would bias the efficiency score 
upwards for the SOBs which have the largest share of loans but also the highest 
proportion of NPLs.  
The inputs for the construction of cost-efficiency additionally require the 
factor prices of the relevant inputs above. We distinguish between the price of labour 
(PL), price of fixed capital (PK) and the price of funds (PF). The price of labour is 
obtained as the ratio of personnel expenses to employees. The price of fixed capital is 
operating expenses less personnel expenses divided by fixed assets (less 
depreciation). The price of funds is obtained from the ratio of interest paid to total 
funds. 
The availability of uniform and comparable data on Chinese banking is a very 
recent development. Researchers have typically made a number of working 
assumptions to fill the gaps in data. In general, balance sheet data is available 
although the data revisions alter the figures from year to year and up until recently the 
accounting standards of Chinese banks differed from international standards (Ng and 
Turton 2001). The number of employees are available for the big four state owned 
banks but not for all of the joint-stock banks over all years. Similarly, the availability 
of personnel expenses varies across banks. In the years that personnel expenses were 
not available, the ratio of personnel expenses to total operating expenses in the 
adjacent year to the missing was applied. In the years where the number of employees 
was not available, the ratio of labour to fixed assets in the most recent year available 
was applied18. Where there were no personnel expenses available, it was assumed that 
                                                 
18 Fu and Heffernan (2005) assume that the employee growth matches the growth of total assets and they use the average wage 
paid by state-owned and other types of financial institutions to estimate labour cost. 
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the bank faced the same capital costs as banks of comparable size, which gave 
personnel costs as a residual.  
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the input and output data for 2004 
as a snapshot indicator of the scale of the variables used. The high standard deviation 
is an indication of the dominance of the 4 state owned banks. 
Table3: Output-Input Variables 2004 (million RMB) 
Variable Description Mean Standard Deviation 
LOANS Total stock of loans 930,026.2 1158139.3 
OEA Other Earning Assets 572,112.7 698281.2 
NII Non-interest income  3,306.0 5083.0 
LOANSQ Loans adjusted for NPLs 861,603 972690.4 
LAB Number employed (labour) 110,050.4 172260.9 
DEP Total Deposits 1,403,333.1 1766172.3 
FA Fixed Assets (less depreciation) 23,455.5 30074.6 
PL Price of labour .08 .046 
PF Price of funds .01 .020 
PK Price of fixed assets .64 .279 
Sources: Fitch/Bankscope, Almanac of China's Finance and Banking (various) and author calculations 
from web sources. 
  
One of the criticisms levelled at the DEA approach is that it produces 
estimates of efficiency that are not open to statistical inference. In other words if a 
DMU has a score of 0.95, in what statistical sense is it 5% inefficient relative to the 
benchmark? Without the capability for statistical inference, non-parametric methods 
would be weak alternatives to parametric methods of estimating efficiency. However, 
uncertainties also exist in the estimation of efficiency using DEA. The most obvious 
uncertainty is what comes from measurement error. Measurement error in the context 
of data on Chinese banks is particularly marked. There are three potential sources of 
error; first differences between local bank's accounting procedures and those of 
international bodies, second differences between local bank's accounting conventions 
and third, researcher assumptions relating to the generation of missing observations. 
Other uncertainties arise from the estimation of the efficiency frontier; changes to the 
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inputs and/or outputs can cause large differences in the resulting scores. Furthermore 
there may be errors in the sampling variation caused by the difficulty in obtaining a 
sufficiently large and consistent sampling frame.  
 Simar and Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b) propose a bootstrap procedure for 
non-parametric frontier models. Bootstrapping is based on the notion that if the data 
can be viewed as a random sample from an underlying population under a model (data 
generating process - DGP), then the process continuous random draws from the 
sample under the model generates also random draws from the population. The 
random raw can be viewed as a pseudo-sample and as a group of new benchmarks to 
compute the efficiency score for a given point. Following the Simar-Wilson method, 
1000 bootstrap values of the individual DMU for all types of efficiency scores are 
generated in each year. Recent bootstrapping applications to DEA have been 
conducted by Löthgren and Tambour (1999); in the case of banking efficiency by 
Casu and Molyneux (2005); and in the case of Chinese rural credit cooperatives, 
Dong and Featherstone (2004). It is not the intention of this paper to give a detailed 
explanation of the Simar-Wilson bootstrapping method but a brief description of the 
method and algorithm is provided in the appendix.   
 
6.0 Empirical Results 
 Table 4 presents the yearly average of the pure DEA scores for each year 
broken down into Cost inefficiency, X-inefficiency (Technical inefficiency) and Rent 
seeking inefficiency for all the banks, the state-owned banks (SOB) and Joint-stock 
banks (JSB), so that Cost inefficiency is the sum of X-inefficiency and Rent-seeking 
inefficiency. We present the results from both CRS and VRS assumptions. The 
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relatively small sample in each year could bias the scale efficiency estimates, which 
raises doubts about the VRS assumption19.   
The numbers in table 4 are the starting point for the bootstrap exercise and are 
only indicators of the scale of the measure. Because they have no inferential capacity, 
there is little that can be said about them from a statistical basis. The difference in 
magnitude between the CRS and VRS estimates of relative X-inefficiency could 
indicate strong scale efficiencies, but this evidence would have to be interpreted with 
caution given the small number of DMUs per year. There is less difference in the rent-
seeking estimates of inefficiency between the two assumptions. What can be said 
from the figures is that relative X-inefficiency has declined from a high in 1999 under 
either assumption. Similarly, the implied measure of inefficiency caused by rent 
seeking has fallen sharply from a high point in 2000 in relative terms. 
Table 4: Mean Inefficiency %, Intermediation Method - CRS and VRS; All 
banks (All), State-Owned banks (SOB), Joint -Stock banks (JSB)  
  X-inefficiency Rent-Seeking 
  All SOB JSB All SOB JSB 
CRS 5.0 3.5 1.2 3.4 5.5 7.0 1997 
VRS 1.4 2.7 1.0 2.9 4.7 2.2 
CRS 3.2 1.7 3.8 6.4 6.3 6.4 1998 
VRS 2.6 0.5 3.4 4.7 7.0 3.8 
CRS 10.3 16.4 8.1 14.8 7.2 17.0 1999 
VRS 5.8 0.5 7.8 14.1 10.0 16.9 
CRS 7.5 16.8 4.0 17.1 8.2 20.4 2000 
VRS 2.8 0.6 3.7 16.2 5.2 20.2 
CRS 6.4 20.0 1.5 14.8 7.0 17.5 2001 
VRS 1.1 0.3 1.4 14.8 8.5 17.2 
CRS 4.4 11.0 2.1 5.2 10.0 3.4 2002 
VRS 1.0 0.3 1.2 4.8 9.1 3.2 
CRS 3.6 10.5 1.0 5.9 13.6 3.1 2003 
VRS 0.9 1.0 0.9 4.1 8.2 2.6 
CRS 4.1 11.0 1.4 6.4 11.5 4.3 2004 
VRS 0.6 0.7 0.3 4.6 6.2 3.9 
CRS 5.6 11.4 2.9 9.3 8.7 9.9 Average 
VRS 2.0 0.8 2.5 8.3 7.4 8.9 
 
                                                 
19 The cluster of four large state-owned banks biases the scale efficiency estimates for the big-4.     
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 The split between the state-owned banks and the joint-stock banks is more 
revealing. The results show that the average level of X-inefficiency is high under the 
CRS assumption for the SOBs but remarkably low under the VRS assumption. This is 
because size favours scale effects and therefore two of the state owned banks (Bank of 
China and ICBC) are benchmarks for the full sample and are therefore technically (or 
X-) efficient and cost efficient. The inefficiency scores for the remaining joint-stock 
banks confirms the trend that relative X-inefficiency has fallen to negligible levels by 
2004. Finally, it would appear that at the end of the period, the average inefficiency 
created by rent seeking is lower in the case of the joint-stock banks compared with the 
state-owned banks, but in terms of the averages for the sample as a whole there is 
little difference.  
 Table 4 also reveals a surprisingly large increase in average cost-efficiency 
(X-inefficiency plus rent-seeking inefficiency) in the period 1999-2001. This may be 
attributable to the activities of the Asset Management Companies set up to strip 
swathes of non-performing loans from the SOBs. In terms of the technology of the 
non-parametric method this would be interpreted as a drop in output but with the same 
factor levels would translate to a decrease in cost efficiency.   
 In Table 5 we present the results of repeating the efficiency estimation shown 
in Table 4 after stripping out identified NPLs from the stock of loans for each bank. 
The argument for stripping out NPLs is twofold. First, the stock of loans is quality 
adjusted by including only active loans. Ignoring the NPLs highlights the distortions 
to the estimates of efficiency caused by the activity of the Asset Management 
companies and the exclusive focus of its operation on the big-4 SOBs. Second, by 
taking out NPLs we make a small step towards the homogeneity of loans for each 
bank. Including NPLs in the stock of loans, creates strong size effects, which 
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compounds the bias to scale efficiency of a small sample size. The large SOBs have 
the largest stock of loans but also the largest amount of NPLs.     
 The adjustment for NPLs reveals a higher average level of X-inefficiency in 
the SOBs compared with the JSBs. While the Bank of China and ICBC continue to 
act as benchmark DMUs, the Agricultural Bank of China and China Construction 
Bank show a lower average level of technical efficiency under both assumptions.  
There is little difference between the average level of rent-seeking inefficiency 
between the SOBs and JSBs over the sample period, but the average level of X-
inefficiency of the JSBs is lower than the rent-seeking inefficiency.  
Table 5: Mean Inefficiency %, Intermediation Method (NPL Adjusted) - CRS 
and VRS; All banks (All), State-Owned banks (SOB), Joint-Stock banks (JSB)  
  X-inefficiency Rent-Seeking 
  All SOB JSB All SOB JSB 
CRS 6.0 31.6 1.8 8.4 7.5 8.2 1997 
VRS 1.4 10.4 1.8 2.1 2.2 2.7 
CRS 9.2 32.6 5.4 5.6 4.6 5.8 1998 
VRS 3.8 11.9 4.8 3.3 4.7 3.3 
CRS 12.2 35.4 7.9 15.3 8.7 16.8 1999 
VRS 6.0 8.5 7.3 14.4 6.2 16.9 
CRS 7.3 26.4 3.7 14.9 6.7 17.6 2000 
VRS 2.9 6.0 3.7 13.6 3.1 17.0 
CRS 5.6 25.9 1.6 9.9 5.8 11.7 2001 
VRS 1.1 5.2 1.4 9.5 5.6 11.6 
CRS 6.4 22.2 4.1 2.7 6.6 2.0 2002 
VRS 2.0 4.9 2.6 3.3 6.0 3.3 
CRS 3.9 15.2 2.2 5.5 13.8 3.9 2003 
VRS 1.5 4.2 1.9 3.3 5.5 3.5 
CRS 6.5 16.3 2.6 6.4 11.0 4.5 2004 
VRS 2.5 4.7 1.7 3.7 3.1 3.9 
CRS 7.1 25.6 3.7 8.6 8.1 8.8 Average 
VRS 2.7 7.0 3.2 6.7 4.6 7.8 
 
While the estimates of efficiency shown in Tables 4 and 5 produce a picture of 
gradual improvement in bank efficiency from the beginning of the 21st century, little 
confidence can be placed on the figures for the lack of appropriate statistical 
significance.  Table 6 presents the results of bootstrap estimation for the CRS 
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assumption only.  For reasons of brevity we show four years for both types of output. 
The reasons for focussing on the results from the CRS assumption are threefold. First, 
the DEA scores are highly sensitive to the sample size and in particular the 
assumption of VRS in the case of a small sample which includes a few relatively large 
banks. The simulations of the pseudo-samples are based on clusters of observations 
and in the case of the SOBs, amount to only four, which biases the efficiency scores 
of the big banks upwards.  
Table 6: Bootstrap Estimates of Inefficiency; 2001-2004 (%) CRS 
Bank Output 2001 2002 2003 2004 
  X-ineff Rent X-ineff Rent X-ineff Rent X-ineff Rent 
ABOC Loans 30.4*** 30.8*** 19.4*** 37.5*** 25.6*** 35.1*** 24.1*** 31.0*** 
 Adjusted  49.1*** 21.6*** 48.4*** 22.1*** 33.7*** 35.0*** 35.6*** 27.4*** 
CCB Loans 46.2*** 15.1*** 24.6*** 27.3*** 10.1*** 43.4*** 15.7*** 33.1*** 
 Adjusted  40.4*** 18.4*** 33.1*** 23.0*** 10.0*** 44.2*** 14.2*** 35.1*** 
BOC Loans 20.4*** 27.1*** 18.2*** 0 18.6*** 0 19.6*** 0 
 Adjusted  19.6*** 27.8*** 18.6*** 0 18.0*** 0 20.4*** 0 
ICBC Loans 37.5*** 13.7*** 13.5*** 30.0*** 19.5*** 26.5*** 22.0*** 25.0*** 
 Adjusted  0 10.6*** 0 24.6*** 0 26.6*** 0 22.6*** 
BComm Loans 34.0*** 0 21.9*** 23.8*** 13.5*** 33.7*** 18.0*** 26.6*** 
 Adjusted  33.1*** 0 27.5*** 21.4*** 14.9*** 33.6*** 16.3*** 29.1*** 
CITIC Loans 27.1*** 24.4*** 31.7*** 0 22.8*** 12.6*** 28.6*** 6.2* 
 Adjusted  25.3*** 21.4*** 34.3*** 0 22.6*** 15.3*** 26.7*** 8.9*** 
CMB Loans 27.2*** 24.6*** 42.1*** 0 42.9*** 0 44.8*** 0 
 Adjusted  27.5*** 12.9** 41.3*** 0 41.5*** 0 46.1*** 0 
CMBCL Loans 20.0*** 27.7*** 13.4*** 20.2*** 15.7*** 9.7*** 12.7
*** 15.4*** 
 Adjusted  14.0*** 29.3*** 13.2*** 21.1*** 17.8*** 8.5*** 14.7*** 15.0*** 
EVERBRT Loans 32.1*** 15.6*** 31.3*** 7.7*** 22.8*** 13.0*** - - 
 Adjusted  28.9*** 17.1*** 34.9*** 8.5*** 28.0*** 11.0*** - - 
FSB Loans 58.8*** 0 26.2*** 0 22.6*** 0 15.5*** 0 
 Adjusted  57.8*** 0 31.0*** 0 30.0*** 0 21.5*** 0 
GDB Loans 20.7*** 29.7*** 5.0*** 4.3*** 14.3*** 10.0*** 10.6*** 23.7*** 
 Adjusted  24.5*** 20.6*** 22.4*** 22.8*** 16.6*** 19.8*** 27.9*** 14.4*** 
HUAXIA Loans 29.4*** 27.2*** 27.3*** 9.5*** 13.5*** 26.2*** 20.8*** 18.6*** 
 Adjusted  27.5*** 24.6*** 26.7*** 10.2*** 12.6*** 28.1*** 19.7*** 20.0*** 
IBCL Loans 37.5*** 13.7*** 13.5*** 30.0*** 19.5*** 26.4*** 21.9*** 25.0*** 
 Adjusted  23.5*** 0 21.3*** 16.8*** 14.9*** 22.7*** 33.5*** 0 
SDB Loans 15.3*** 36.3*** 12.5*** 21.8*** 10.2*** 23.7*** 11.8*** 24.9*** 
 Adjusted  17.3*** 25.9*** 14.3*** 23.9*** 13.5*** 24.8*** 8.8*** 30.6*** 
SPB Loans 27.1*** 33.8*** 28.4*** 8.8*** 30.8*** 0 31.8*** 0 
 Adjusted  26.0*** 28.4*** 31.8*** 5.9*** 32.6*** 0 34.0*** 0 
Average 
 
Loans 
Adjusted 
29.4 
30.6 
22.3 
17.2 
22.4 
28.5 
15.5 
13.3 
19.8 
22.2 
17.2 
17.9 
22.1 
25.1 
14.6 
14.5 
*** significant at 1% level one-tailed test; ** significant at the 5% level one-tailed test; * significant at 
the 10% level. Estimates not significantly different from zero at the 10% are reported as zero.  
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Secondly, the evidence of scale economies in banking is mixed. Early studies 
tended to confirm the existence of constant returns to scale 20, however more recent 
findings suggest that there are significant scale economies for large banks21.  Thirdly, 
the bootstrap estimates under the VRS assumption showed implausibly low levels of 
cost efficiency and no difference between the estimates of cost efficiency and 
technical efficiency (no scale or allocative inefficiency) for all but two of the JSBs 
(for both types of output). The SOBs had implausibly high scores for cost and 
technical efficiency. Furthermore the estimates of cost efficiency from the CRS 
estimates are similar to the findings of Fu and Heffernan (2005) for roughly the same 
sample period using stochastic frontier methods. 
The estimates of inefficiency shown in Table 6 are based on the medians 
rather than the means as the former provide a more robust measure of the scores when 
the distributions are skewed as in the case of DEA. Table 6 shows that the bootstrap 
estimates of inefficiency are higher than those obtained from the simple DEA results 
shown in Tables 4 and 5.  The adjusting of loans for NPLs had a significant effect in 
worsening the X-inefficiency score of the Agricultural Bank of China (ABOC) but 
improving it to zero in the case of ICBC. The pattern of differences for the JSBs is 
easier to examine in the aggregate. Three questions can be asked about the bootstrap 
estimates as a whole. First, is there a significant difference between the level of X- 
and rent-seeking inefficiency between the SOBs and JSBs and what differences do the 
NPL adjustment to loans make? Second is their evidence that inefficiency is being 
reduced over time. Third, if there is evidence of inefficiency reduction, is there a 
difference between the speed of reduction between the SOBs and JSBs?  We explore 
these questions in turn.  
                                                 
20 See Hunter and Timme (1986) and Berger et. al. (1987). 
21 Berger and Mester (1997) and Altunbas and Molyneux (1996). 
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Table 7 below examines the difference in group means of inefficiency for the 
whole sample for the two types of banks. It is clear that X-inefficiency is significantly 
higher in the SOBs than JSBs once NPLs have been stripped out of the loan portfolio.  
This means that the NPLs in the existing loan portfolio of the SOBs (even after the 
activity of the asset management companies) disguise a weaker average level of X-
efficiency compared with the JSBs. It is also the case that the SOBs exhibit a higher 
average level of rent seeking inefficiency than the JSBs. 
Table 7: Mean inefficiency, Unadjusted loans and NPL adjusted loans (CRS) 
Inefficiency Unadjusted 
SOB 
Unadjusted 
JSB 
t value Adjusted 
SOB 
Adjusted 
JSB 
t Value 
X-ineff 25.9% 27.8% 0.65 36.4% 31.3% 1.70* 
Rent 35.2% 20.9% 4.14*** 30.6% 18.8% 3.90*** 
*** significant at the 1%, ** significant at the 5%, * significant at the 10%  
 
The next two questions are addressed by regressing the change in inefficiency 
on its lagged value. The estimated coefficient on the lagged value of inefficiency can 
be treated as the parameter of adjustment. A significant negative value indicates that 
inefficiency is declining (efficiency improving). The larger the absolute value of the 
parameter, the faster the speed of adjustment. The regressions are conducted as a 
panel of the form tititi YY ,1,, eba ++=D - with adjustment for heteroscedasticity. The 
results are shown in Table 8. 
Table 8: Beta value Inefficiency adjustment, CRS  
Inefficiency Bank Group b  - 
Unadjusted 
t value b  - NPL 
adjusted 
t value 
SOB -1.35 -17.20*** -.197 -3.05*** 
JSB -.902 -11.26*** -.543 -8.29*** 
X-
inefficiency 
All Banks -.979 -13.16*** -.454# -8.13*** 
SOB -.755 -9.14*** -.826 -7.08*** 
JSB -.980 -10.62*** -.507 -5.59*** 
Rent-
seeking 
All Banks -.877# -10.80*** -.648 -7.51*** 
# including SOB intercept dummy; *** significant at the 1% 
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   The most important result of Table 8 is that under both definitions of output 
there is strong statistical evidence of a negative trend in inefficiency.  In this respect, 
the results of this paper differ from the findings of Chen et. al. (2005) who find no 
discernible trend improvement in cost efficiency22.  The speed of decline in X-
inefficiency (improvement in technical efficiency) is greater for the SOBs than the 
JSBs, but once output is adjusted for NPLs it can be seen that the speed of decline in 
X-inefficiency between the two types of banks is reversed. The speed of decline of 
rent seeking inefficiency is marginally higher for the SOBs in the NPL adjusted case 
but the difference is minor, possibly because of political pressures that would inhibit 
downsizing and labour shedding at too fast a rate. 
 Using parametric methods, Fu and Heffernan (2005) find cost inefficiency in 
the order of 50% over the period 1993-2002. These findings are consistent with the  
bootstrap estimates obtained here and also the broad findings of Chinese scholars 
cited in this paper. Such findings have typically generated a consensus of pessimism 
about the future of Chinese banking. Our findings suggest grounds for optimism in 
that in terms of relative efficiency, Table 8 shows that the trend is towards improved 
performance.  
 
7.0  Conclusion   
The premise of this paper is that cost inefficiency can be partitioned into X-
inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency in the spirit of Crain and Zardkoohi (1980). 
If this premise is accepted, the implication for the current thrust of official bank 
policy in China is positive. According to Leibenstein (1966), X-efficiency is 
improved through managerial motivation and external pressure. Impending 
                                                 
22 Chen et. al (2005) uses a wider data frame of banks, including regional joint-stock banks and international trust and 
investment companies. It can be argued that the use of DMUs that do not compete in the same geographical market or product is 
a violation of the homogeneity requirement of DEA. 
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competition and the deregulation of the Chinese banking market can be expected to 
motivate managers to improve performance and utilise existing factors of production 
fully. Competition for well-qualified staff between the different banking firms will 
raise rewards and attract the best graduates. The potential outflow of the best staff to 
the higher paying institutions will motivate a greater focus on training, modernization 
and efficiency. 
Bureaucratic rent seeking is a rational response to a particular set of incentives 
based on protectionist policy. It would be no surprise to learn that over the years of 
protected growth, as the banks were vessels for the channelling of unprofitable loans 
to state-owned enterprises, the response of the banking sector was to develop rent 
seeking strategies and act as employment sponges for the educated youth in China. 
The dismantling of protection and the invitation to list the state-owned banks and the 
joint stock banks will alter the incentive structure for managers and consequently 
there should be a trend reduction in rent-seeking inefficiency. 
This paper has argued that in the context of a protected banking sector such as 
the Chinese banking sector, measures of cost inefficiency can be decomposed into X-
inefficiency and rent-seeking inefficiency. We have used non-parametric methods to 
conduct an analysis of inefficiency in a sample of Chinese banks. The estimates of 
bank inefficiency were buttressed with bootstrapping techniques to enable statistical 
inference. In general, the estimates from bootstrapping support the view that relative 
efficiency has improved. However, we must still interpret the results with caution. 
The improvement in efficiency is in terms of the benchmark banks, which are 
themselves 'best-practice' Chinese banks. The real benchmarks should be foreign 
banks competing on an equal footing or foreign banks operating in their home 
countries under similar conditions of development and risk.   
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This paper does not suggest that the Chinese banking system is in good shape 
to face the threats of post 2007. The argument of this paper is that the threat of an 
open market to foreign banks has resulted in significant improvements in bank 
efficiency. The main message of this paper is that while Chinese banks may not be in 
the best shape they could be to meet the challenges of post 2007, they are in better 
shape than they have ever been. 
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Appendix: DMUs and Bootstrapping Procedure  
 
Table of Data 2004 
Mnemonic Bank Earning 
Assets rmb 
(million) 
Operational 
Cost rmb 
(million) 
Employment 
 
ABOC Agricultural Bank 
of China 
3,794,322 50,385 489,425 
BOC Bank of China 3,929,961 41,915 164,193 
ICBC Industrial & 
Commercial Bank 
of China 
5,352,093 27,999 427,221* 
CCB China 
Construction Bank  
3,765,229 44,285 310,391 
CITIC CITC Industrial 
Bank 
493,867 4,635 9,918 
HUAXIA Hua Xia Bank 297,395 2,740 7,007 
CMB China Minsheng 
Bank 
435,761 4,470 6,382 
CMBCL China Merchant 
Bank Co Ltd 
587,439 6,514 17,829 
IBCL Industrial Bank 
Co Ltd 
331,813 3,048 7,135* 
EVERBRT China EverBright 
Bank** 
364,784 3,830 8,569 
SDB Shenzen 
Development 
Bank 
198,802 2,483 8,757* 
GDB Gunagdon 
Development 
Bank 
310,857 5,598 11,702 
FSB First Sino Bank 4,738 58 258* 
SPB Shanghai Pudong 
Bank 
442,806 4,431 8,288 
BOCOMM Bank of 
Communications 
1,085,858 13,493 54,408 
* estimated, ** 2003 only 
 
The bootstrap procedure for non-parametric frontier models is set out in Simar and 
Wilson (1998, 2000a, 2000b). The efficiency scores calculated with the original data 
are used to construct pseudo data. The bootstrap procedure is based on the idea that 
there exists a DGP, which can be determined by Monte Carlo simulation. By using the 
estimated distribution of the DGP to generate a large number of random samples, a set 
of pseudo estimates of the efficiency scores iqˆ  are obtained. However this 'naive' 
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bootstrap yields inconsistent estimates (Simar and Wilson, 2000a). A homogeneous 
bootstrap procedure that produces consistent values of iqˆ  from a kernel density 
estimate is given in Simar and Wilson (2000b). The bootstrap algorithm is 
summarised in the following steps. The algorithm is run on MATLAB and the codes 
are available from the authors on request. 
Step 1. Compute the original DEA efficiency scores using the linear programming 
model (equation 1) and let ii qd ˆ/1ˆ = ; 
Step 2. Since radial distances are used, we will refer to the polar coordinate of the 
input vector of each DMU x defined by its modulus xxx ¢== )(ww  and its angle 
1
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Step 3. Compute the estimated covariance matrices 1Sˆ , 2Sˆ  of L and LR by 
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where 11S  is )1()1( -+´-+ NMNM , 2112 SS ¢=  is 1)1( ´-+ NM and 22S  is scalar, 
and compute the lower triangular matrices 1L  and 2L  such that 111ˆ LL ¢=S  and 
222
ˆ LL ¢=S  via the Cholesky decomposition. 
Step 4. Choose an appropriate bandwidth h as described in Simar and Wilson (2000b) 
using the information in L~ , 1Sˆ , 2Sˆ . 
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Step 5. Draw K rows randomly, with replacement from the augmented matrix L~  and 
denote the result by the )( NMK +´  matrix *~L ; compute *z , the 1´K  row vector 
containing the means of each column of *~L . 
Step 6. Use a random number generator to generate a )( NMK +´  matrix e of i.i.d. 
standard normal pseudo-random variates; let .ie  denote the ith row of this matrix. 
Then compute the )( NMK +´  matrix *e  with the ith row *.ie  given by jii L¢= .
*
. ee  so 
that )ˆ,0(~*. jNMi N S+e  where j=1 if the ith row of 
*~L  was drawn from rows 1, . . . , K 
of L~ , or j=2 if the ith row of *~L  was drawn from rows (K + 1), . . . , 2K of L~ . 
Step 7. Compute the )( NMK +´  matrix ***2/12 )~()1( zihLMh K Ä+++=G
- e  
where KKK iiKIM ¢-= )/1(  is the usual KK ´  centring matrix with KI  denoting an 
identity matrix of order K, Ki  an 1´K  vector of ones, and Ä denotes the Kronecker 
product. 
Step 8. Partition G  so that [ ]321 iii ggg=G , where Mi R+Î1g , [ ] 12 2/,0 -Î Ki pg  and 
),(3 +¥-¥Îig  for i = 1, . . . , K. Define the )( NMK +´  matrix of bootstrap pseudo-
data *L  such that the i the row *iz  of 
*L  is given by 
î
í
ì
-
³
=
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Step 9. Translate the polar coordinates in *L  to Cartesian coordinates. This yields the 
bootstrap sample { }Kiii yx 1** ),( = .  
Step 10. For the given point (x, y), compute ),(ˆ* yxq  by solving the DEA program 
taking { }Kiii yx 1** ),( =  as the benchmarks and compute the bias-corrected efficiency 
scores *2 ˆ/ˆ),(~ qqq =yx  
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Step 11. Repeat Steps 5~11, obtain another group of bias-corrected efficiency scores, 
reducing the input vector of each DMU x into xq
~
. Compute the cost efficiency scores 
using equation(2) from the reduced inputs and outputs. 
 Step 12. Similar to Step 11, obtain rent-seeking-efficiency scores (the difference 
between cost-efficiency score and technical (x)-efficiency score) 
Step 13. Repeat Steps 5~12 B (=1000) times to obtain a set of bootstrap estimates 
{ }Bbb yx 1),(~ =q  and cost efficiency scores and x-efficiency scores. 
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